All posts by John Mount

What is a win vector?

From time to time we are asked “what is the company name Win-Vector LLC referring to?” It is a cryptic pun trying to be an encoding of “we deliver victory.”

The story is an inside joke referring to something really only funny to one of the founders. But a joke that amuses the teller is always enjoyed by at least one person. Win-Vector LLC’s John Mount had the honor of co-authoring a 1997 paper titled “The Polytope of Win Vectors.” The paper title is obviously mathematical terms in an odd combination. However the telegraphic grammar is coincidentally similar to deliberately ungrammatical gamer slang such as “full of win” and “so much win.”

2829551 full of win

If we treat “win” as a concrete noun (say something you can put in a sack) and “vector” in its non-mathematical sense (as an entity of infectious transmission) we have “Win-Vector LLC is an infectious delivery of victory.” I.e.: we deliver success to our clients. Of course, we have now attempt to explain a weak joke. It is not as grand as “winged victory,” but it does encode a positive company value: Win-Vector LLC delivers successful data science projects and training to clients.


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Winged Victory: from Wikipedia

Let’s take this as an opportunity to describe what a win vector is. Continue reading

Reading the Gauss-Markov theorem

What is the Gauss-Markov theorem?

From “The Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics” B. S. Everitt, 2nd Edition:

A theorem that proves that if the error terms in a multiple regression have the same variance and are uncorrelated, then the estimators of the parameters in the model produced by least squares estimation are better (in the sense of having lower dispersion about the mean) than any other unbiased linear estimator.

This is pretty much considered the “big boy” reason least squares fitting can be considered a good implementation of linear regression.

Suppose you are building a model of the form:

    y(i) = B . x(i) + e(i)

where B is a vector (to be inferred), i is an index that runs over the available data (say 1 through n), x(i) is a per-example vector of features, and y(i) is the scalar quantity to be modeled. Only x(i) and y(i) are observed. The e(i) term is the un-modeled component of y(i) and you typically hope that the e(i) can be thought of unknowable effects, individual variation, ignorable errors, residuals, or noise. How weak/strong assumptions you put on the e(i) (and other quantities) depends on what you know, what you are trying to do, and which theorems you need to meet the pre-conditions of. The Gauss-Markov theorem assures a good estimate of B under weak assumptions.

How to interpret the theorem

The point of the Gauss-Markov theorem is that we can find conditions ensuring a good fit without requiring detailed distributional assumptions about the e(i) and without distributional assumptions about the x(i). However, if you are using Bayesian methods or generative models for predictions you may want to use additional stronger conditions (perhaps even normality of errors and even distributional assumptions on the xs).

We are going to read through the Wikipedia statement of the Gauss-Markov theorem in detail.

Continue reading

Diversion: Win-Vector LLC’s Nina Zumel takes time off to publish a literary book review

Win-Vector LLC’s Nina Zumel takes some time off to publish a literary book review: Reading Red Spectres: Russian Gothic Tales.

Hundertwasser domes

Nina Zumel also examines aspects of the supernatural in literature and in folk culture at her blog, multoghost.wordpress.com. She writes about folklore, ghost stories, weird fiction, or anything else that strikes her fancy. Follow her on Twitter @multoghost.

Automatic bias correction doesn’t fix omitted variable bias

Page 94 of Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson, Vehtari, Rubin “Bayesian Data Analysis” 3rd Edition (which we will call BDA3) provides a great example of what happens when common broad frequentist bias criticisms are over-applied to predictions from ordinary linear regression: the predictions appear to fall apart. BDA3 goes on to exhibit what might be considered the kind of automatic/mechanical fix responding to such criticisms would entail (producing a bias corrected predictor), and rightly shows these adjusted predictions are far worse than the original ordinary linear regression predictions. BDA3 makes a number of interesting points and is worth studying closely. We work their example in a bit more detail for emphasis. Continue reading

Frequentist inference only seems easy

Two of the most common methods of statistical inference are frequentism and Bayesianism (see Bayesian and Frequentist Approaches: Ask the Right Question for some good discussion). In both cases we are attempting to perform reliable inference of unknown quantities from related observations. And in both cases inference is made possible by introducing and reasoning over well-behaved distributions of values.

As a first example, consider the problem of trying to estimate the speed of light from a series of experiments.

In this situation the frequentist method quietly does some heavy philosophical lifting before you even start work. Under the frequentist interpretation since the speed of light is thought to have a single value it does not make sense to model it as having a prior distribution of possible values over any non-trivial range. To get the ability to infer, frequentist philosophy considers the act of measurement repeatable and introduces very subtle concepts such as confidence intervals. The frequentist statement that a series of experiments places the speed of light in vacuum at 300,000,000 meters a second plus or minus 1,000,000 meters a second with 95% confidence does not mean there is a 95% chance that the actual speed of light is in the interval 299,000,000 to 301,000,000 (the common incorrect recollection of what a confidence interval is). It means if the procedure that generated the interval were repeated on new data, then 95% of the time the speed of light would be in the interval produced: which may not be the interval we are looking at right now. Frequentist procedures are typically easy on the practitioner (all of the heavy philosophic work has already been done) and result in simple procedures and calculations (through years of optimization of practice).

Bayesian procedures on the other hand are philosophically much simpler, but require much more from the user (production and acceptance of priors). The Bayesian philosophy is: given a generative model, a complete prior distribution (detailed probabilities of the unknown value posited before looking at the current experimental data) of the quantity to be estimated, and observations: then inference is just a matter of calculating the complete posterior distribution of the quantity to be estimated (by correct application of Bayes’ Law). Supply a bad model or bad prior beliefs on possible values of the speed of light and you get bad results (and it is your fault, not the methodology’s fault). The Bayesian method seems to ask more, but you have to remember it is trying to supply more (complete posterior distribution, versus subjunctive confidence intervals).

In this article we are going to work a simple (but important) problem where (for once) the Bayesian calculations are in fact easier than the frequentist ones. Continue reading

R style tip: prefer functions that return data frames

While following up on Nina Zumel’s excellent Trimming the Fat from glm() Models in R I got to thinking about code style in R. And I realized: you can make your code much prettier by designing more of your functions to return data.frames. That may seem needlessly heavy-weight, but it has a lot of down-stream advantages. Continue reading

Skimming statistics papers for the ideas (instead of the complete procedures)

Been reading a lot of Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson, Vehtari, Rubin “Bayesian Data Analysis” 3rd edition lately. Overall in the Bayesian framework some ideas (such as regularization, and imputation) are way easier to justify (though calculating some seemingly basic quantities becomes tedious). A big advantage (and weakness) of this formulation is statistics has a much less “shrink wrapped” feeling than the classic frequentist presentations. You feel like the material is being written to peers instead of written to calculators (of the human or mechanical variety). In the Bayesian formulation you don’t feel like you will be yelled at for using 1 tablespoon of sugar when the recipe calls for 3 teaspoons (at least if you live in the United States).

Some other stuff reads differently after this though. Continue reading

Save 50% on Practical Data Science with R (and other titles) at Manning through May 30, 2014

Manning Publications Inc. is launching an exciting new MEAP: Practical Probabilistic Programming (which we have already subscribed to) by offering a 50% discount on Practical Probabilistic Programming and other titles (including Practical Data Science with R!). To get the discount put the books in your Manning shopping car and then add the promotional code ppplaunch50 (through May 30, 2014) into the coupon code field in the “other” section on towards the bottom of the account form. See below for other Manning books eligible for this generous discount. Continue reading